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Abstract
We formulate the central bank’s problem of selecting an optimal
long-run inﬂation rate as the choice of a distorting tax by a planner
who wishes to maximize discounted stationary utility for a heteroge-
neous population of inﬁnitely-lived households in an economy with
constant aggregate income and public information. Households are
segmented into cash agents, who store value in currency alone, and
credit agents who have access to both currency and loans. The plan-
ner’s problem is equivalent to choosing inﬂation and nominal inter-
est rates consistent with a resource constraint, and with an incentive
constraint that ensures credit agents prefer the superior consumption-
smoothing power of loans to that of currency. We show that the opti-
mum inﬂation rate is positive, because inﬂation reduces the value of
the outside option for credit agents and raises their debt limits.
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1.1 Overview
Central bankers have comfort zones for long-run inﬂation and nominal in-
terest rates which deviate substantially from the prescriptions of economic
theory. For example, Federal Reserve ofﬁcials have at times stated a pref-
erence for core inﬂation in the one-to-two percent annual range, in general
agreement with the more explicit inﬂation targets of the European Central
Bank, the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and other
institutions. This target is typically achieved with a nominal interest rate
near ﬁve percent.
Economic theory, on the other hand, calls for an inﬂation target that is
consistentwiththeFriedmanruleofazeronominalinterestrate. Thatinﬂa-
tion target is minus the growth rate of real income in life cycle economies
(Freeman (1993), Abel (1987)), or minus the sum of the rate of time pref-
erence plus an adjustment for income growth in representative household
economies (Friedman (1969), Foley and Sidrauski (1969), Woodford (1990)).
Why do central banks prefer low inﬂation rates to outright deﬂation?
One argument is that deﬂation subsidizes the holding of money at the ex-
pense of deposits and loans, causing disintermediation and a weakening of
ﬁnancial markets, as in Smith (2002). Another argument concerns the im-
pact of the zero bound on nominal interest rates in environments where the
central bank is committed to lower interest rates when economic activity
weakens, as suggested by Summers (1991); for an analysis see Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) or Adam and Billi (2006).
In this paper we take the disintermediation argument seriously and use
it in reverse: if a small deﬂation hurts asset markets, then a small inﬂa-
tion may help them. We explore an economy in which moderate inﬂation
loosens debt constraints, deepens ﬁnancial markets and improves the abil-
1For helpful comments on earlier versions of this research we thank Marcus Berliant,
Steve Williamson, Randy Wright, and audiences at various universities and conferences.
We thank Geetanjali Pande for research assistance. All errors are the responsibility of the
authors.
1ity of asset-trading households to smooth consumption. At the same time,
inﬂation imposes a distortionary tax on money-trading households which
works in the opposite direction. The central bank must choose the inﬂation
rate to balance improvements in ﬁnancial markets with deadweight losses
from inﬂation.
1.2 What we do
We analyze an endowment economy with constant aggregate income, pop-
ulated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households whose income shares
ﬂuctuate over time. All individual characteristics are public information.
There are two asset markets, for currency and consumption loans. House-
holds are exogenously divided into two groups, called cash agents and
credit agents. Members of the ﬁrst group are anonymous and can store
value only in currency of which they hold nonnegative amounts. This
group is made up of individuals who do not or cannot trade in asset mar-
kets, because they have defaulted in the past or face prohibitive transaction
costs.
Members of the second group can participate in either market subject
to endogenous participation or debt constraints that successfully deter de-
fault: This group may hold assets in positive or negative amounts. Default
is punished with perpetual exclusion from the loan market but still permits
households to take long positions in currency.
In this environment, deﬂation raises the payoff from using money and
makes default more attractive for borrowers. That, in turn, tightens the
participation constraint (lowers debt limits) and weakens the loan market.
Conversely, inﬂation raises debt limits and deepens the loan market up to
the point where constraints cease to bind.2
2Levine (1990) was probably the ﬁrst to argue that positive inﬂation may be optimal in
the presence of individual income volatility and credit constraints.
21.3 Main results
We formulate the central bank’s problem of selecting an optimal long-run
inﬂation rate as the choice of a distorting tax by a benevolent central plan-
ner who wishes to maximize a convex combination of discounted utilities
for cash and credit agents, subject to a participation constraint that keeps
credit agents from renouncing the loan market and switching to currency.3
When aggregate income is constant, the deﬂation required by the Fried-
man rule turns out to be an infeasible choice for any planner who assigns
positive weight to credit households. Deﬂation subsidizes currency at the
expense of consumption loans, and increases the payoff from cash-holding
above the payoff to loan-trading, leading credit agents to default on their
loans and forcing the credit market to shut down.
At the other end of possible inﬂation targets, an inﬂation rate higher
than the minimum required to slacken debt constraints is equivalent to a
distortionary income transfer from lower-welfare cash agents to higher-
welfare credit agents. Planners who do not assign extraordinarily high
weight to credit agents will reject inﬂation rates above the value needed
to relax debt constraints on credit agents.
If the relative weight of credit households in the social welfare function
is above zero and less than or equal to their population weight, we show
that the optimum rate of inﬂation is positive and moderate. We interpret
these ﬁndings to be consistent with the comfort zones articulated by some
of the world’s leading central banks, and explain why ﬁscal tools cannot
achieve constrained efﬁcient outcomes.
1.4 Recent related literature
Several recent papers in the monetary theory literature have themes related
to the ones in this paper.4 The central theme in much of this literature is the
3Appendix D provides the set up of the corresponding competitive economy where the
inﬂation rate selected by the planner can be sustained as an equilibrium.
4The intellectual origins of this literature date back to Bewley (1980) who showed that
the Friedman rule is inconsistent with competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy
3infeasibility of the Friedman rule for monetary policy in economic environ-
ments with broadly deﬁned private information like hidden action, hidden
information, lack of commitment, or search frictions. In all of these envi-
ronments, households are able to evade the taxes required to implement
the Friedman rule by witholding information about their type or by simply
defaulting on their tax or loan obligations.
The Friedman rule typically turns out to violate truth-telling or partic-
ipation constraints in economies with private information and related fric-
tions. Small positive amounts of inﬂation, on the other hand, help relax
these constraints by strengthening incentives to repay loans, lowering the
real rate of interest, or by encouraging the use of credit at the expense of
currency.
An early example of this line of work is Aiyagari and Williamson (2000),
who study an environment with unobservable random endowments in
which ﬁnancial intermediaries sell debt contracts to households. These au-
thors ﬁnd that an increase in inﬂation raises the penalty for default but they
do not deﬁne an optimum rate of inﬂation.
Optimum inﬂation is well-deﬁned in a recent paper by Berentsen, Cam-
era, and Waller (2007) who study the role of credit in the search-theoretic
framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). They analyze an environment with
search frictions in which money is essential for exchange and ﬁnancial in-
termediaries cannot enforce the repayment of loan contracts; they can only
refuse future credit to defaulters. An increase in inﬂation again raises the
penalty for default because it lowers the payoff to using money. Berentsen,
et al. (2007) show that the optimal rate of inﬂation is positive if the rate of
time preference is less than the fraction of sellers in the total population of
agents.
A related result appears in Andolfatto (2007), who looks at the search
model of money without credit. Here the Friedman rule is feasible and
optimal if agents are sufﬁciently patient, infeasible otherwise. In the latter
case, the optimum rate of inﬂation is again positive. Broadly similar con-
with uninsurable idiosyncratic risks when currency is the only store of value.
4clusions are reached by Ragot (2006), who studies a two-period life cycle
growth model with money in the utility function, and private information
about the technology of intermediate goods production. Only producers
of intermediate goods are constrained in this environment; households are
not.
Deviatov and Wallace (2007) is a computational study of a Lagos and
Wright (2005) environment with features similar to the ones emphasized in
the present paper. In particular, an exogenous fraction of agents are mon-
itored and hence have known histories, while the remainder are anony-
mous; in addition, aggregate productivity has periodicity two, resembling
the alternating endowment process in the present paper. Defaulters in
credit arrangements become anonymous agents. The optimal monetary
policy is relatively complicated and takes incentive constraints into account
as in the present paper, but the analysis is not concerned with an optimal
inﬂation target as is present paper.5
The key difference between recent literature and our paper is that we
study monetary policy in economies with public information and complete
markets in which money is a store of value and limited enforcement is the
only friction allowed. An optimum inﬂation target in our class of environ-
ments is associated with a constrained optimum allocation achieved by a
planner who can only extract voluntary taxes from households. This con-
strained optimum duplicates the competitive equilibrium outcome at an
efﬁcient steady state.6
A different but related literature on taxation considers the effects of in-
5The idea that an increase in inﬂation may deter activity in certain sectors of the econ-
omy, and through this effect produce desirable consequences in the economy as a whole, is
a theme that has been analyzed from other points of view. For example, Huang, He, and
Wright (2006) study banking in an environment where money is essential for exchange,
and in addition theft is possible. Here banks have an additional safekeeping role; positive
inﬂation may then be desirable because it taxes thieves.
6We leave for a future paper the question of how a market economy reaches this desir-
able steady state. An earlier paper of ours, Antinolﬁ, Azariadis, and Bullard (2007), shows
that economies with limited enforcement typically have many Pareto-ranked equilibrium
outcomes when monetary policy is passive, and that active monetary policy may serve as
an equilibrium selection device.
5ﬂation on the redistribution of income and not, as we do, on its allocation
over time. For example, da Costa and Werning (2007) study the interaction
between labor income taxation and the inﬂation tax, and determine condi-
tions under which the combination of these two forms of taxation is Pareto
efﬁcient. Erosa and Ventura (2002), and Albanesi (2005) study the welfare
costs of inﬂation in models where low-income agents tend to use cash more
oftenthanhigh-incomeagents; theyassessthewelfarecostsofinﬂationand
the time consistency of monetary and ﬁscal policies. Bhattacharya, Haslag,
and Martin (2005) study economies in which the redistribution effects of
inﬂation dominate, in a welfare sense, the direct effect of inﬂation on the
desirability of money as a store of value, thus justifying departures from
the Friedman rule.
2 Environment
We describe the optimal rate of long-run inﬂation and analyze the asso-
ciated optimal consumption plans in an endowment economy populated
by four types of inﬁnitely-lived household types, indexed by i = 0,1,2,3.
Household types 0 and 1 have mass λ/2 each, and households 2 and 3
have mass 1 ￿ λ/2 each, where 0 ￿ λ ￿ 1. Individual income shares ﬂuc-
tuate deterministically and total income is constant. Time is discrete and is

























(1+ α,1￿ α) if t = 0,2,...
(1￿ α,1+ α) if t = 1,3,...
(2)
with α 2 (0,1). This endowment pattern means that type 0 and type 1
agents have negatively correlated income shares, as do agents 2 and 3.
We introduce a critical difference between these two agent-pairs: We call
agents 0 and 1 credit agents, and agents 2 and 3 cash agents. Cash agents
are anonymous households who may only use currency to smooth income
ﬂuctuations, as in Bewley (1980). No claims can be enforced on them or by
them. Credit agents may enter into loan arrangements to smooth consump-
tion subject to endogenous debt limits that give them proper incentives to
repay, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993).8
Incentives to repay loans are strongest, and debt limits are highest,
when the payoff to default is lowest. We assume that credit agents who
default are forever excluded from the loan market and must instead use
money as a store of value. Clearly, the payoff to default at any point in time
depends on future inﬂation rates.
The government acts as a benevolent central planner who chooses a
constant inﬂation tax at which cash agents can trade currency across pe-
riods, and directly selects consumption vectors for credit agents who may
7In a growing economy, individual incomes need not be negatively correlated but in-
come shares must be. This simple deterministic endowment process is the degenerate case
of a stochastic economy with two Markovian states and a zero probability of remaining in
the same state. Markovian endowments with two states are a straightforward and interest-
ing extension which permits persistent shocks to individual incomes. The assumption of
two states or dates has obvious geometric advantages, but it is not innocuous where policy
is concerned. We discuss this point further in the concluding section.
8One interpretation of the model is that the cash agents correspond to an “unbanked
sector” in actual economies, and that the credit agents correspond to the remainder of the
population which has better access to unsecured credit facilities. Recent studies suggest
that the proportion of households which are unbanked is perhaps 9 to 15 percent of the U.S.
population, although this can be higher depending on the deﬁnition of “unbanked.” For a
discussion of these issues, see Caskey, Duran, and Solo (2006) and Vermilyea and Wilcox
(2002). In Mexico City, the proportion is much higher; 76.4 percent according to Caskey, et
al. (2006). Respondents in surveys often cite factors related to anonymity as to why they do
not use a bank account.
7either accept their allocations or behave like cash agents in perpetuity. The
inﬂation target in this economy is similar to choosing an optimal tax subject
to an incentive constraint. When the government chooses a positive rate of
inﬂation, it imposes a tax on cash agents and confers two beneﬁts on credit
agents: a transfer of resources from the cash sector as well as a reduction in
the default payoff which brings about higher debt limits. Inﬂation, up to a
point, deepens the credit market.
3 Inﬂation targeting as a planning problem
3.1 Overview
We now analyze inﬂation targeting as the solution to a particular station-
ary equal-treatment planning problem in which similar households are al-
located similar consumption bundles independently of time. Allocations
depend on household type only. To begin with, we suppose that the plan-
ner knows the following data:
(a) The common utility function and common income process of all
households.
(b) The ability to identify agents i = 0 and i = 1, that is, to recognize all
credit agents as well as their current income.
However,
(c) The planner does not know the current income of cash households
and cannot discriminate between agent types i = 2 and i = 3.
A complete list of feasible actions for the planner and households is as
follows.
(i) No household can be forced to pay a tax or surrender any part of its
endowment against its will.
(ii) Any cash agent may purchase from the planner a non-negative stock
of enforceable IOU’s. Each IOU costs one unit of current consumption and
pays off 1/π units of consumption next period. We call the constant para-
meter π > 0 the implied “inﬂation factor.”
8(iii) Given the tax rate 1 ￿ 1
π, cash agents choose the amount of IOU’s
theywishtobuyfromtheplanner. OneoptioniszeroIOU’s, whichamounts
to autarky, that is, to consuming one’s own endowment in perpetuity.
(iv) The planner collects all revenues from the “inﬂation tax,” and asks
all credit agents to surrender their endowments in return for a binding
commitment from the planner to allocate forever cH > 0 units of consump-
tion to each high income credit agent, and cL > 0 units of consumption
to each low income credit agent. The planner’s overall commitments to
credit agents cannot exceed the combined endowment of that group plus
the net revenue from the implied inﬂation tax. We call the marginal rate of
substitution u0 (cH)/[βu0 (cL)] the implied “real interest yield.”
(v) Credit households reserve the right to reject the planner’s proposal
and behave instead like cash households. This includes the option to re-
main autarkic in perpetuity.
Next we describe the planning problem in three steps:
￿ The monetary authority sets a constant inﬂation factor π, or a tax rate
1￿ 1
π.
￿ Given π, high income cash agents choose a periodic consumption
vector (xH,xL) ￿ 0 to maximize stationary discounted utility
1
1￿ β2 [u(xH) + βu(xL)] (3)
subject to
xH ￿ 1+ α, (4)
xH + πxL = 1+ α + π (1￿ α), (5)
and
u(xH) + βu(xL) ￿ u(1+ α) + βu(1￿ α). (6)
The ﬁrst inequality restricts excess demand for goods by high income
cash agents to be nonpositive, and purchases of IOU’s from the plan-
ner to be nonnegative. The second relation is a two-period budget
9constraint which assumes that credit households completely use up
the planner IOU’s or “money balances” to smooth consumption in
low income dates. The third inequality allows households who dis-
like the announced inﬂation rate to renounce forever the use of IOU’s
and consume their endowments in perpetuity.
￿ Let xH (π) and xL (π) solve the previous problem. Given π, the plan-
ner now chooses consumption values (cH,cL) ￿ 0 for credit house-
holds to maximize the equal-treatment welfare function
1
1￿ β2 [u(cH) + u(cL)] (7)
of the credit community, subject to the resource constraint
λ(cH + cL) + (1￿ λ)[xH (π) + xL (π)] = 2, (8)
and the participation constraint
u(cH) + βu(cL) ￿ u[xH (π)] + βu[xL (π)]. (9)
Equal treatment of high income and low income households means
thatthediscountedutilitiesareweightedequally. Highincomehouse-








The welfare function in equation (7) is a linear combination of these
twodiscountedutilitieswitheachgroup’sweightequalto1/(1+ β).
In addition, note that the resource constraint equates aggregate con-
sumption with aggregate income. In other words, the planner allo-
catestothecreditgroupthecombinedendowmentofallcredithouse-
10holds plus current revenue from IOU’s just issued minus the redemp-
tion value of IOU’s sold last period. Finally, the participation con-
straint ensures that high income credit agents prefer the planner’s
proposed allocation to using planner IOU’s, that is, prefer to smooth
their consumption through “credit” rather than through “money.”
￿ If cH (π) and cL (π) solve the previous problem for a given π > 0, the
planner selects the stationary implied inﬂation factor π to maximize
the social welfare function
W (π,δ) = δfu[cH (π)] + u[cL (π)]g
+ (1￿ δ)fu[xH (π)] + u[xL (π)]g.
This social welfare function assigns equal weights to members of the
same group but potentially different weights to different groups. In
particular, it weighs each credit community member by δ/(1+ β),
where δ 2 (0,1), and cash community member by (1￿ δ)/(1+ β).
A strictly utilitarian welfare function, like the one used by Deviatov
andWallace(2007), wouldhaveequalweightsforallhouseholds, that
is, δ = λ.
3.2 Optimum inﬂation without incentive constraints
To build up intuition, we solve the planner’s problem outlined in section
3.1, ignoring for the moment the incentive constraints laid out in equations
(6) and (9). As a ﬁrst step we allow lump-sum income transfers from cash
agents to credit agents which permits us to also ignore the cash agents’
budget constraints (4) and (5). All the planner has to do is maximize the
social welfare function
W (π,δ) = δ[u(cH) + u(cL)] + (1￿ δ)[u(xH) + u(xL)] (10)
subject to the economy’s overall resource constraint
λ(cH + cL) + (1￿ λ)(xH + xL) = 2. (11)
11The obvious solution is (cH,cL,xH,xL) = (c￿,c￿,x￿,x￿) where c￿ and x￿
solve the following pair of equations:
δu0 (c) = (1￿ δ)u0 (x)
λc + (1￿ λ) x = 1.
We call this solution the ﬁrst best. The implied optimal inﬂation and nomi-
nal interest rates can be inferred from the consumption Euler equation for












Suppose next that the planner cannot impose a lump-sum tax on any
agent but must instead use inﬂation or deﬂation, and redistribute the re-
sulting seigniorage from one group to another. Inﬂation is a proportional
tax on the excess supply of goods by high income cash agents; it transfers
resourcesfromcashtocredithouseholds. Deﬂationdoestheexactopposite.
The planner must now choose (π,cH,cL) to solve the problem outlined in
section 3.1 subject to all constraints except (6) and (9). We call this outcome
the second best.
To understand the optimum rate of inﬂation at the second best allo-
cation, we examine the two polar cases δ = 1 and δ = 0. The ﬁrst case,
which assigns no welfare weight to the cash-using community, leads the
planner to select that value of π which minimizes the consumption of that
community. The maximum possible amount of seigniorage is transferred
to the credit community, and the consumption of credit agents is smoothed
completely.
Deﬁne the maximal seigniorage inﬂation factor from
˜ π = argmin
π￿1
[xH (π) + xL (π)] > 1. (14)
12Figure 1: Social indifference curves for δ = 0.
Then the planner sets (π,cH,cL) = ( ˜ π, ˜ c, ˜ c) where ˜ c can be read from the
resource constraint
2λ˜ c + (1￿ λ)[xH ( ˜ π) + xL ( ˜ π)] = 2. (15)
In addition, cH = cL implies βRN = ˜ π. The second best allocation turns out




= ( ˜ π, ˜ π/β). (16)
At the other extreme, δ = 0 describes a society in which the planner
cares about the cash community only. This planner will deﬂate the econ-
omy in order to reduce the aggregate consumption of credit households,
pushing the inﬂation factor as close to zero as possible. That is obvious
from Figure 1 below, which superimposes the budget constraint of the high
income cash household against social indifference curves that turn out to
be symmetric about the diagonal.
A utilitarian social welfare function with δ = λ represents a sensible
compromisebetweentheextremesjustdescribed. Aplannerendowedwith
13a utilitarian social welfare function will choose a second best rule that com-
bines mild deﬂation with a small positive interest rate to guarantee smooth
consumption for credit agents. The following result is proved in the Ap-
pendix.
Theorem 1 The second best optimum allocation under a utilitarian social welfare
function satisﬁes (cH,cL,xH,xL) = (c￿￿,c￿￿,xH (π￿￿),xL (π￿￿)). It is sup-
ported by a second best rule for some inﬂation factor π￿￿ 2 (β,1), and a nominal
yield such that RN = π￿￿/β > 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 The role of incentive constraints
4.1 Basic assumptions
We suppose in what follows that the incentive constraints are restrictive
enough to rule out both the ﬁrst-best and the second-best allocations de-
scribed in the previous section, and defeat the planner’s desire to smooth
completely the consumption proﬁle for both the credit and the cash com-
munity. Deﬁne y(π) to be the combined consumption of a pair of high
income and low income credit agents. This consumption is maximal when
the implied inﬂation factor π is equal to the maximal seigniorage inﬂation
factor ˜ π. From the resource constraint we obtain
cH + cL = y(π) ￿
1
λ
[2￿ (1￿ λ)(xH (π) + xL (π))].
Our key assumptions are these:
A1. ¯ R ￿
u0(1+α)
βu0(1￿α) < 1,






> u[xH ( ˜ π)] + βu[xL ( ˜ π)].
14Figure 2: Assumptions A1 and A2.
Assumptions A1 and A2 state that individual income shares are neither
very stable nor highly variable. In particular, A1 asserts that autarky is an
allocation with a low implied rate of interest ¯ R and therefore cannot be a
constrained efﬁcient allocation for the credit community.9 Geometrically,
we require the initial endowment point Ω = (1+ α,1￿ α) in Figure 2 to lie
below the tangency point G on the budget line cH +cL = 2. This assertion is
innocuous. Itmeansthattheincomevariabilityparameter α islargerelative
to the consumer’s rate of time preference if α is the same for all households.
If, however, α should vary across households, then autarky is a low interest
rateequilibriumwhenevertherateoftimepreferenceissmallrelativetothe
largest α in the population.10 Roughly speaking, A1 amounts to asserting
that there is at least one household in the economy whose income share
ﬂuctuates more than three or four percent per year.
9On this point, see Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
10That is so because an autarkic allocation is decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
by assigning a zero debt limit to all agents except the one with the lowest income growth
rate, and by a competitive interest factor that exactly matches the autarkic marginal rate of
substitution of the household with the lowest income growth rate.
15The next assumption, A2, rules out plans that combine perfect con-
sumption smoothing for credit agents with a zero rate of inﬂation, which
would decentralize the golden rule allocation for cash agents. Zero implied
inﬂation means no transfers of income between groups. Perfect consump-
tion smoothing for credit agents is achieved by the allocation cH = cL = 1
whose payoff is below autarky by assumption A2. In Figure 2, the ﬂat-
consumption allocation point E lies below the indifference curve that goes
through the initial endowment point Ω.
This assumption, too, is empirically innocuous: It holds automatically
for values of α near zero. If α were to vary across households, assumptions
A1 and A2 would assert that income shares are nearly constant for some
agents and quite variable for others. But since we have only one endow-
ment proﬁle in the entire economy, we need to assume that income shares
are neither too smooth nor too variable. That is what is embodied in as-
sumptions A1 and A2.
It is worth noting that assumption A2 is inconsistent with the Fried-
man rule for reasons similar to those advanced by Aiyagari and Williamson
(2000), Berentsen, etal., (2007), andAndolfatto(2007). Anyconstant, resource-
feasible consumption plan (cH, cL, xH, xL) = (c￿, c￿, 2 ￿ c￿, 2 ￿ c￿) will be
vetoed by high-income credit agents who will refuse to pay the implied
deﬂation tax.
The last assumption is a bit more controversial. It claims that credit
agents can achieve perfectly smooth consumption albeit at higher rates of
inﬂation. A3 asserts that it is within the power of the central planner, and of
the central bank, to lower the rate of return facing users of cash to the point
where the incentive constraint on credit users becomes slack. A3 states
that allocations with perfectly smooth consumption, cH = cL = y(π)/2,
are feasible at the maximum seigniorage rate of inﬂation and also at lower
rates. For all of these implied inﬂation rates, the payoff from credit use
exceeds the payoff from cash use. Figure 3 illustrates.
Let
v(π) ￿ u[xH (π)] + βu[xL (π)]
16Figure 3: Assumption A3.
denote the two period payoff to any high income household using planner
IOU’s or “money.” Then, for any isoelastic utility function u : R+ ! R
for which cH and cL are gross substitutes, the seigniorage function y(π) is
continuous, positive, and increasing in π for all π 2 (1, ˜ π); positive and
decreasing in π for all π 2 ( ˜ π,1/ ¯ R); and zero at π = 1 and π = 1/ ¯ R.
The demand for money by cash agents vanishes at π = 1/ ¯ R as households
switch to autarky.
Assumption A3,togetherwiththecontinuityofthefunction y(π),guar-
antees the existence of an inﬂation factor ¯ π in the open interval (1, ˜ π) for
which
(1+ β)u[y( ¯ π)/2] = v( ¯ π). (17)
High income credit households are indifferent between cash and credit at
π = ¯ π, and the participation constraint (9) becomes slack when inﬂation
reaches that value. In a decentralized economy, debt constraints will cease
to bind, and the loan market will smooth consumption perfectly, when in-
ﬂation is in the closed interval [ ¯ π, ˜ π].
17Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between credit rationing and inﬂa-
tion by graphing the payoffs to “credit” and “money” users when the credit
community enjoys constant consumption. These payoffs are exactly equal
at π = ¯ π and again at some higher πm 2 ( ˜ π,1/ ¯ R). Discounted utility v(π)
from the use of money is a monotonically decreasing function of the inﬂa-
tion tax π for any π less than 1/ ¯ R. When π reaches or exceeds 1/ ¯ R, the
rate of return on money falls below the implied yield on autarky, and the
demand for money as a store of value vanishes altogether.
Constant consumption for credit households rises as the inﬂation fac-
tor increases from 1 to ˜ π, then falls as π increases further from ˜ π to 1/ ¯ R.
Seigniorage dries up at that point, and cH = cL = 1 for all π ￿ 1/ ¯ R. How-
ever, for implied inﬂation factors in the interval ( ¯ π,πm), “credit” pays off
more than “money.” This means that imposing the incentive or participa-
tion constraint (9) on credit households improves the planner’s ability to
smooth the consumption proﬁle of the credit community.11
4.2 Inﬂation and social welfare
We are now ready to deal with the complete planning problem described
in Section 3.1. Our strategy is to show that the social welfare function
W (π,δ):
￿ Is continuously differentiable for all π ￿ 1;
￿ Is undeﬁned for π < 1 because deﬂation contradicts the participation
constraint (9);
￿ Increases rapidly in π at π = 1;
￿ Decreases in π for all π 2 [ ¯ π,1/ ¯ R] if δ ￿ λ;
11The planner may in principle attempt to smooth the credit community’s consumption
vector by transfers of “money,” that is, by selling IOU’s to credit agents. However, nonneg-
ative IOU balances will not be demanded by rationed low income credit agents who wish
to go short or by unconstrained high income credit agents for whom money as a store of
value yields less than loans.
18Figure 4: Inﬂation and credit rationing.
￿ Is constant for π larger than 1/ ¯ R.
These properties guarantee the existence of an optimum inﬂation factor
π? (δ) = arg max
π2[1,1/ ¯ R]
W (π,δ) ￿ 1, > 1 if δ > 0.
The appendix contains a proof of the following result.
Lemma 2 Deﬁne Wπ (π,δ) = ∂W/∂π. Then (a) Wπ (π,δ) < 0 8(π,δ) 2
[ ¯ π, ˜ π]￿[0,λ];(b)Wπ (π,δ) isincreasingin δ 8 π 2 [ ¯ π, ˜ π];and(c)limπ!1Wπ (π,δ) =
+∞ when π converges from above.
The intuition for part (a) is fairly simple. For any π > ¯ π, assumption
A3 says that smoothing the consumption of credit households is consistent
with the participation constraint. To raise π above ¯ π does not improve the
ability of the planner to smooth the consumption of the credit community
any further. Doing so merely transfers income from the cash community,
who are consuming less than two units of total income, to the credit com-
munity who are consuming more. This transfer will reduce social welfare
19except in cases where the favored credit households are extraordinarily im-
portant to the central planner, that is, when δ > λ.
Part (b) can be understood in a similar way. At very small positive rates
of inﬂation, the aggregate consumption of each community is proportional
to its population weight and, by assumption A2, cH is substantially differ-
ent from cL. A tiny increase in the inﬂation tax transfers a tiny amount of
resources between two groups with roughly the same marginal utility of
income. This insigniﬁcant transfer would have essentially no impact on
the social welfare function except that it lowers the discounted utility of
money for the credit community, allowing the central planner to dramati-
cally smooth the consumption vector (cH,cL). The reason for this improve-
ment is that the planner is able to set up at a zero inﬂation rate a credit
market which cannot function under deﬂation.
Next we prove, again in the appendix, Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 W (π,δ) is not deﬁned for π < 1. It is decreasing in π for π 2
( ˜ π,1/ ¯ R) and constant for π ￿ 1/ ¯ R.
The key part of Lemma 3 is understanding why the reduced-form social
welfare function W (π,δ), deﬁned at the end of Section 3.1, does not exist
for π < 1 or, equivalently, why deﬂation violates the participation con-
straint for high income credit households. Deﬂation means that each high
income cash household will consume a vector (xH,xL) such that xH + xL >
2, attaining a point above the budget line xH + xL = 2. The corresponding
high income credit household will consume (cH,cL) such that cH + cL < 2,
reaching a point below the previous budget line. The outcome of any de-
ﬂation is that money has a higher payoff than credit.12
The main result of this section, which follows directly Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3, is stated below.
12Money is less useful as an asset in a growing economy which permits the planner to
let the inﬂation rate drop below zero when the growth rate of aggregate income is positive.
See Section 5 for details.
20Figure 5: Inﬂation and social welfare.
Theorem 4 Suppose assumptions A1, A2, and A3 hold, and δ > 0. Then the op-
timum inﬂation factor is π? (δ) > 1. Optimum inﬂation is an increasing function
of the welfare weight δ of credit agents and such that π (0) = 1,π (1) = ˜ π.
Figure 5 uses Lemmas 2 and 3 to illustrate the planner’s SWF for some
welfare weight δ 2 (0,λ) and any inﬂation factor π ￿ 1. Assumption
A3 generates large improvements in the planner’s consumption smooth-
ing power from relatively small inﬂation rates. As inﬂation goes up, these
improvements taper off, and beyond the optimum value π? (δ) they are
negated by the deadweight loss of the inﬂation tax.
Arelatedresultinasearch-theoreticframeworkisProposition5inBerentsen,
et al. (2007) where the optimum inﬂation rate is ¯ π, that is, the rate at which
borrowers become unrationed. This result obtains when the rate of time
preference is less than the population fraction of agents who are selling
consumption goods for money.
215 Extensions and conclusions
Whatfactorsshouldabenevolent, independentcentralbankconsiderwhen
it sets a long run inﬂation target? Summers (1991) has expressed the view
that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates dictates an inﬂation tar-
get above zero. This paper suggests that a very different mechanism may
be at work. In particular, Theorem 4 shows that, for an economy with lim-
ited enforcement, constant aggregate income and no collateral, the inﬂation
target should strike a balance between the deadweight loss from inﬂation
and the potential improvement in credit market conditions.
How does economic growth affect inﬂation targets? Suppose, for exam-
ple, that all the endowments described in equation (2) are multiplied by a




where γ ￿ 0, and βg ￿ βg1￿γ < 1. In this growing economy the mathe-
matical structure of the planning problem, deﬁned in Section 3.1, remains
the same if we replace the original discount factor β with a modiﬁed βg and
the original inﬂation factor π with the modiﬁed inﬂation factor πg ￿ gπ.
For any utility function with γ ￿ 1 (which implies gross substitutabil-
ity of intertemporal consumption goods), increases in g effectively raise
the planner’s patience and slacken the incentive constraints. We conjecture
that this increase in effective patience will allow the planner to smooth con-
sumption better at any given rate of inﬂation, and will lessen the need to
subsidize the loan market at the expense of the currency market. The out-
come should be a lower inﬂation target π? for any given welfare weight
δ. This conjecture is easily veriﬁed for the logarithmic utility function with
γ = 1. In this case, the planner’s effective discount rate remains at β and
by Theorem 4 the optimum inﬂation rate should be πg = π? (δ) or π =
π? (δ)/g. In other words, the sum of the inﬂation target plus the growth
rate is a constant independent of the growth rate itself.
We also conjecture that collateral borrowing should have an effect on
22inﬂation targets similar to that of higher growth rates. Collateral improves
the ability of credit agents to smooth consumption in a state of default by
combining long positions in currency with short positions in collateralized
loans. This will raise the payoff to default for cash agents and reduce the
debt limits on non-collateral loans. Total borrowing, however, should im-
prove as income becomes better collateral, and so will the planner’s ability
to smooth consumption without relying too much on the intermediating
effect of higher inﬂation.13
We expect the opposite conclusions to obtain when the variability of
individual income shares, as measured by the parameter α, goes up. This
change should raise the payoff from market participation and relax debt
constraints. Nevertheless, some of this additional idiosyncratic risk will
have to be borne by credit agents in the form of higher consumption vari-
ability. The appropriate response of the central planner in this situation
is likely to be a higher inﬂation target, that is, an attempt to subsidize the
credit mechanism at the expense of money holding.
In principle, ﬁscal policy alone can achieve socially optimal outcomes
just as well as monetary policy can, but the required lump-sum policies
bear no resemblance to the linear or progressive income taxes we observe
in practice. For example, debt limits on credit agents improve if we redis-
tribute income from low to high endowments and thus raise the gains from
trading in loan markets. Optimal outcomes can also be supported directly
if we replace pre-tax endowments with the constrained efﬁcient allocations
desired by the planner. In this case, the demands for money and loans van-
ish and asset markets become superﬂuous.
The main conclusion of this paper is that independent central banks
will set low positive inﬂation targets in economies that possess highly de-
veloped ﬁnancial markets. This ﬁnding seems to be broadly consistent
with the comfort zones articulated by some of the world’s leading central
13A calibration exercise in Ragot (2006) suggests that the optimum annual inﬂation rate
is only 1.5 percent if 10 percent of intermediate goods producers are rationed, but rises to 4
percent when rationing affects 50 percent of those producers.
23bankers. Less fortunate societies with relatively undeveloped asset mar-
kets will choose higher inﬂation targets to improve credit market perfor-
mance. Slower growth tends to raise inﬂation targets, and the highest tar-
gets should be expected from stagnating economies with poorly developed
ﬁnancial institutions.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
The planner chooses (π,cH,cL) to maximize the utilitarian SWF
W (π,cH,cL,λ) = λ[u(cH) + u(cL)]+
(1￿ λ)[u(xH (π)) + u(xL (π))]
26subject to the resource constraint (8) and the deﬁnitions of xH (π), xL (π)
from equations (3), (4), and (5). The solution will clearly satisfy cH = cL =
c. Using the resource constraint, we rewrite the SWF in the form
W (π,λ) = 2λu
￿




(1￿ λ)[u(xH) + u(xL)].












H (π) + u0 (xL) x0
L (π)



















Next we show that W is an increasing function of π at π = β, and a
decreasing one for all π ￿ 1. Since W is continuous in π, the intermediate
value theorem implies that it attains a maximum in the interval (β,1). To






H (β) + x0
L (β)
￿￿
u0 (xL) ￿ u0 (c)
￿
where xH (β) = xL (β) > 1 > c from the budget constraints, and x0
H (π) +
x0
L (π) < 0 for all π, as shown by Figure 1. It follows that W is increasing
in π at π = β.
Continuingalongthislineofargument, weobservethat β/π islessthan
or equal to β for any π ￿ 1, and x0
H (π) > 0 for all π if dated consumption
















27Next, we differentiate the budget constraint in equation (5) and obtain
x0
H = 1￿ α ￿ xL ￿ πx0
L. (20)















Here, for any π ￿ 1, the budget constraints and the consumption Euler
equation for cash agents jointly imply c > 1 > xL and 1 ￿ α ￿ xL < 0.
Therefore, equation (21) leads to
Wπ (π,λ)
1￿ λ
￿ [xL ￿ (1￿ α)]
￿





(1￿ π)u0 (c) ￿ (1￿ βπ)u0 (xL)
￿
￿ [xL ￿ (1￿ α)](1￿ β)u0 (xL)
￿x0
L (π)u0 (xL)[1￿ π ￿ 1+ βπ]
because u0 (c) < u0 (xL). Continuing,
Wπ (π,λ)
1￿ λ
￿ (1￿ β)u0 (xL)
￿
xL ￿ (1￿ α) + πx0
L
￿
= ￿(1￿ β)u0 (xL) x0
H (π)
by equation (20). Since x0
H (π) is positive for all π, Wπ (π,λ) < 0 for all
π ￿ 1. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Part (a). The Lemma is trivial for large π 2 [ ˜ π,1/ ¯ R]. We focus on π 2
[ ¯ π, ˜ π]. Now note that the derivative
Wπ (π,δ) = δ
￿
u0 (cH)c0







H + u0 (xL) x0
L
￿
28can be written as








because y(π)/2 = cL = cH and u0 (xH) = (β/π)u0 (xL). Continuing,
recall that x0
H > 0 by gross substitutes, β/π < 1 by assumption, and x0
H +
x0












































(1￿ δ)u0 (cL) ￿ (1￿ δ)u0 (xL)
￿





< u0 (cL) ￿ u0 (xL). (22)
Note next that β < π implies xL < xH; cL ￿ cH by assumption, and also
cL + cH > 2 > xL + xH for all π 2 ( ¯ π, ˜ π). It follows that cL > xL and
therefore that the right hand side of inequality (22) is negative. From this
and the fact that x0
H + x0
L < 0 we infer that Wπ (π,δ) < 0 for all π 2 ( ¯ π, ˜ π)
and all δ 2 (0,λ].
Part (b). Recall that Wπ is proportional to the expression
δ(1￿λ)
λ u0 (cL)￿
(1￿ δ)u0 (xL) which is an increasing function of δ for all (δ,λ).
Part (c). Assumption A3 asserts that the central planner cannot set cH =
cL for any π 2 (1, ¯ π) without violating the participation constraint (9). For
any π in that interval, the planner will smooth consumption as much as the
participation constraint allows, choosing cH (π) to be the smallest solution
to the equation
u(cH) + βu[y(π) ￿ cH] = v(π) (23)
￿ u[xH (π)] + βu[xL (π)],




v0 (π) ￿ βu0 (cL)y0 (π)
u0 (cH) ￿ βu0 (cL)
. (24)
Note also that, at π = 1, we have
cH (1) = xH (1),
cL (1) = xL (1),
cH (1) + cL (1) = xH (1) + xL (1) = 2.
Next we compute
Wπ (1,δ) = u0 (xH (1))
￿
δc0
























y0 (1) ￿ c0
H (1)
￿
+ (1￿ δ) x0
L (1)
= Q + (β ￿ 1)δc0
H (1)
where
Q ￿ β(1￿ δ) x0




H (1) = lim
π&1
c0
H (π) = ￿∞
by equation (24) because
v0 (1) ￿ βu0 (cL (1))y0 (1) < 0
as the sum of two negative terms, and
u0 (cH (1)) = βu0 (cL (1)).
Therefore limπ&1 Wπ (1,δ) = +∞. This completes the proof.
30C Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of this lemma is straightforward as shown in Figure 5. Note,
however, that for π > 1/ ¯ R the payoff to money is just autarky. Therefore,
we have
W (π,δ) = δ[u(ˆ x) + u(2￿ ˆ x)] + (1￿ δ)[u(1+ α) + βu(1￿ α)]
￿ ˆ W,
where ˆ x 2 (1,1+ α) is the smallest solution to the equation
u(x) + βu(2￿ x) = u(1+ α) + βu(1￿ α).
D The Competitive Economy
In the competitive economy agents maximize lifetime utility subject to re-
source, participation, and debt constraints. Speciﬁcally, cash agents maxi-
mize utility taking the return on money as given, and subject to a standard
budget constraint as well as a participation constraint which keeps the pay-
off from using money at least as large as the payoff from autarky. Credit
agents also maximize lifetime utility subject to standard budget and par-
ticipation constraints, but must also satisfy additional constraints that limit
debt. Credit agents take as given these debt limits, which are designed to
deter default by equating the payoff from solvency to the payoff from de-
fault. In particular, debt limits will depend on equilibrium intertemporal
prices, that is, on inﬂation and the interest rate. Thus, they are endogenous
to the economy even though credit agents take them as given. Finally, an
equilibrium in the competitive economy is a set of consumption allocations
that solves the agents’ maximization problems, and a set of debt limits and
prices such that debts are repaid and consumption good, credit, and money
markets clear. We now describe formally the competitive economy.
High-income cash agents maximize the present value of a periodic util-
ity ﬂow given by
1
1￿ β2 (u(xH) + βu(xL))
31subject to
xH = 1+ α ￿ m,




and m ￿ 0. Here pt is the money price of the consumption good. The
budget constraints reduce immediately to
xH + πxL = 1+ α + π(1￿ α)
with
xH ￿ 1+ α.
Cash agents must also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
u(xH) + βu(xL) ￿ u(1+ α) + βu(1￿ α),
whichstatesthatmoneyisweaklypreferredtoautarky, andthenon-negativity
constraint mt ￿ 0 that imposes non-negative savings on all cash agents.





where π = pt+1/pt. The corresponding condition for a low-income cash





At any equilibrium where π > β, we obtain xH > xL. As long as the inﬂa-
tion rate is such that the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding
both (25) and (26) will hold. In particular, (26) implies that low-income
cash agents are constrained, in the sense that they would like to increase
consumption at time t, but cannot borrow against future income.
The problem that credit agents solve is similar. They maximize the
same utility ﬂow but have different budget and incentive compatibility
constraints. The budget constraints of an agent reﬂect the possibility of
32buying new claims, sH and sL, and repaying maturing claims, RsH and
RsL:
cH = 1+ α ￿ sH + RsL, (27)
cL = 1￿ α + RsH ￿ sL. (28)
In equilibrium 0 ￿ sH = ￿sL; high-income agents lend, and low-income
agents borrow. The incentive compatibility constraints take the form of a
voluntary credit-market participation constraint
u(cH) + βu(cL) ￿ u(xH) + βu(xL),
or, equivalently, of borrowing constraints for each agent:
sL + bL ￿ 0,
sH + bH ￿ 0.
Here (bL,bH) > 0 are the largest debt limits consistent with borrowers not
defaulting. These limits are deﬁned indirectly by equating the payoffs from
solvency and default for high-income agents as they prepare to repay past
loans. In particular, we put sH = ￿sL = bL in the budget constraints (27)
and (28), and substitute the outcome into the payoff equality relationship
1
1￿ β2 (u(1+ α) + βu(1￿ α)) =
1
1￿ β2 (u(cH) + βu(cL)).
By analogy with equations (25) and (26), ﬁrst-order conditions hold at
equality for the unrationed high-income credit agent, that is
u0(cH) = βRu0 (cL),
but at inequality for the credit-rationed low-income agent:
u0(cL) ￿ βRu0 (cH).
The consumption good market clears if
λ(cH + cL) + (1￿ λ)(xH + xL) = 2.
33The economy as described has many equilibria. For example, there are
always undesirable equilibria at relative prices which shut down either the
loan market or the money market or both. Among them is one in which all
agents are in autarky. In this paper, we focused on socially desirable equi-
libria in which both markets are active, and asked the question of which
stationary inﬂation rate a policy maker would choose in order to maximize
welfare.
34